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PLEADING-DEMURRER-COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AGAINST CITY
OFFICIALS FOR DEATH OF PRISONER-People v. Guthner-No.
14574-Decided September 18, 1939-District Court of Denver
-Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge-Affirmed in part and reversed
in part.
FACTS: Action brought by the people on the relation of Coover
against named officials of Denver and their bondsmen to recover damages
for the death of son of Coover, occurring while he was confined in the
city jail, and occasioned, as it is alleged, by the wrongful, unlawful and
wanton conduct of said officials. The amended complaint charged the
sheriff personally with the alleged wrongs. The trial court sustained a
demurrer to the complaint.
HELD: 1. The amended complaint charging the sheriff person-
ally with the alleged wrongs is not vulnerable to a general demurrer, and
he should be required to answer.
2. The judgment as to the warden and his bondsman is affirmed,
but as to the other defendants it is reversed.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. EN BANC.
MOTION TO QUASH SUMMONS-AGENCY-SERVICE OF PROCESS ON
FOREIGN CORPORATION--Junior Frocks, Inc. v. District Court of
Denver and Joseph J. Walsh as District Judge-No. 14256-De-
cided September 11, 1939-Original proceeding. Writ of prohibi-
tion granted.
FACTS: A. Petitioner, a corporation of Missouri, sued out a writ
of certiorari, or prohibition in the Supreme Court against the District
Court of Denver and Hon. Joseph J. Walsh as judge thereof on the
ground that the District Court erroneously overruled a motion to quash
a certain summons issued in a case in which one V was plaintiff.
B. Petitioner's affidavits in support of its motion to quash, as
uncontradicted, show that the summons was served on one A, that the
auto driven by him (and which allegedly caused the accident, injuring
V) was driven by A, belonged to him personally, that the petitioner
neither owned any interest in it nor operated or in any way controlled
it or attempted to interfere with or direct the operation, or even suggested
the use, or the manner of the use, of it, or required A to provide any
motor transportation, etc., so that the relation of principal and agent
could not have existed in the running of the car, or rendered the peti-
tioner responsible for the collision.
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HELD: 1. The facts negative any liability on the part of the peti-
tioner and the motion to quash should have been sustained.
2. Where it appears that A, the driver of the car, was an inde-
pendent, itinerant solicitor of sales, in numerous states, of merchandise
manufactured by petitioner and by' other manufacturers, that he had no
established place of business, that he solicited orders from merchants with
the aid of samples, that he merely obtained orders which he sent by mail
to petitioner, that the latter accepted or rejected them and assumed all
credit responsibility as to those accepted, that it paid A 72 ' % of pur-
chase price of accepted orders as a commission, that A paid all his own
expenses, chose his own method of transportation, that the goods on
accepted orders were shipped from outside Colorado, etc., A was .not the
agent of the petitioner so as to permit service of process on the petitioner
by serving A.
3. Interstate business which consists of or results from the mere
solicitation of orders from prospective purchasers cannot lawfully be
interfered with by a state.
4. The petitioner was not engaged in business in Colorado to the
extent that it was subjected to the local jurisdiction for the purpose of
service of process upon it.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bock and Mr. Justice Burke not participating.
CRIMINAL LAW--STATUTORY RAPE-KNOWLEDGE OF AGE-ASSIGN-
MENT OF ERROR-COMMON LAW MARRIAGE-Efseuer v. People
-No. 14378-Decided September 18, 1939-District Court of
Denver-Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. One who has sexual intercourse with girl under 18 at
the time of the act charged is guilty whether he did or did not know that
she was under the statutory age of consent, unless they were then and
there husband and wife.
2. Motion for directed verdict of not guilty on ground that de-
fendant and prosecuting witness were man and wife, properly overruled
where there is no competent evidence in record that a common law mar-
riage existed at the time of the act.
3. The Supreme Court will not of its own motion exercise its
discretionary power to consider errors, not properly assigned, where the
record reveals that the defendant has unconditionally admitted the act
which constitutes the crime for which he was convicted.
4. The admission of evidence brought out by counsel for plain-
tiff in error on cross-examination cannot later be used as a ground for
reversal.
5. Conduct of defendant in procuring is inconsistent with the
bona fide intent required to constitute common law marriage.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Bock dissenting. EN BANC.
368 DICTA
ARBITRATION-AWARD--SUIT TO SET SAME ASIDE-Twin Lakes
Reservoir and Canal Co. v. Platt Rogers, Inc.-No. 14323-De-
cided September 25, 1939-District Court of Pueblo County-
Hon. Harry Leddy, Judge-Reversed with instructions.
FACTS: In a dispute upon a contract between the parties, the mat-
ters were submitted to the arbitrators and judgment entered in the Dis-
trict Court upon their awards. The plaintiff herein then instituted in
the District Court the instant matter for the purpose of setting aside and
vacating the award and the judgment rendered thereon. The court sus-
tained a demurrer to the complaint.
HELD: 1. Where it appears that the board of arbitrators failed
to give reasonable notice in writing of the time and place their hearings
were to be held, and where it appears that each of the parties was not
given reasonable opportunity to promptly present to such board the evi-
dence it desires to offer in support of its position with reference to claims
of defendant, such conduct on the part of the board affords a sufficient
ground for setting aside the award.
2. Although the arbitration agreement provides that the arbitra-
tors shall have power to make such independent investigation of the mat-
ters in controversy as to them may seem necessary in order to arrive at a
correct solution of the matter, no authority is thereby conferred upon
them to adopt the conclusions of outsiders who may be consulted, with-
out a considered determination of their own upon the information so
obtained. They may not delegate their powers.
3. Awards, even though valid on their faces, may be set aside in
equity for misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, and extrinsic evi-
dence is admissible to prove such misconduct. The demurrer is to be
overruled.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bock and Mr. Justice
Burke not participating. EN BANC.
TEACHER'S CONTRACT - CONDITION PRECEDENT - LICENSING -
SCHOOL DISTRICTS-STATUTES-Union High School District v.
Paul-No. 14438-Decided September 25, 1939-District Court,
Prowers County-Hon. John L. East, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Suit on teacher's contract to recover salary. Defense asserts
that teacher (plaintiff) was not properly licensed, although she had letter
signed by President and Secretary of High School District granting her
the "privilege to teach the commercial courses in our high school for three
years, * * *." The trial court directed a verdict for plaintiff.
HELD: 1. Under Sec. 219, Chap. 146, '35 C. S. A. the law
requires the proper licensing of a teacher as a condition precedent to
teaching and recovery of salary for such services.
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2. A contract employing a teacher who does not possess a valid
license is void ab initio.
3. The Union High School Board did not have the authority to
grant a teaching license.
4. The governing body of a school district has in general only
such powers as are expressly conferred upon it by constitutional or
statutory provisions, or powers which are incidental to those expressly
conferred.
5. "Statutes conferring powers or investing duties must be strictly
construed and must be treated, not merely as grants of powers, but also
as limitations thereon."
6. Where a new board takes over the duties of the predecessor
board in operation of a "continuing pre-existing district," the new board
might have the power to issue licenses, if the old board had it; but where
a new and distinct entity is created, it does not have, by implication or
otherwise, the powers of the component pre-existing districts included
within its boundaries which, after the formation of the union district,
still continued to exercise their integral functions under the management
of their respective district boards.
7. The existence of the power in the union district to license
teachers may not be implied from the circumstance that it provided voca-
tional instruction in its high school.
8. A school district may not by ratification legally accomplish
a result which it could not bring about by its direct action in the first
instance.
9. The protection of a statute requiring discharge of teacher only
upon good cause shown after a specific charge and opportunity to be
heard thereon before the school board is available only to a duly licensed
teacher.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice
Bakke concur.
NEGLIGENCE - PERSONAL INJURIES - AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT -
EVIDENCE - WITNESSES - JURORS - VERDICT-Ison et al. v.
Stewart - No. 14430 - Decided September 25, 1939 - District
Court of Denver-Hon. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Suit for damages, brought by S., driver of car against K.
and I., the latter as agent of and driver of truck for K., resulting from
collision between car and truck.
HELD: 1. It is proper to permit mechanics, who have had years
of' experience in repairing wrecked automobiles, who have had full
opportunity to make inspection, and who are acquainted with the con-
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ditions resulting from an auto accident, to give in evidence their opinions
of what occurred at the time of the collision.
2. The unauthorized viewing of the premises by members of
the jury has been held in some jurisdictions as grounds for a new trial,
but the rule must be given a reasonable operation and not be applied
where there is only a possibility that the result was influenced by the
alleged misconduct.
3. The case is not one justifying an exception to the general rule
that affidavits of jurors are inadmissible to impeach their verdicts.
4. Admitting the possibility that newly discovered evidence
would have impeached a witness, where his evidence is merely corrobora-
tive, and where there is no probability that it would have changed the
result of a trial, and where there is no showing of diligence on the part
of the defendants in discovering this evidence, the Supreme Court cannot
believe defeandants were prejudiced by refusal of trial court to grant new
trial on such ground.
5. There was no error in court's refusal to separate the causes of
action because I. was the servant and K. the employer. "The relation-
ship being admitted, the inclusion of I. as a defendant in the only sub-
stantial cause of action arising out of the accident, if error, was entirely
harmless."
6. Instructions examined and found to contain no error.
7. Where suit is brought for $15,000.00 damages, and actual
damages proven amount to $2,600.00, a verdict for $5,000.00, includ-
ing about $2,400.00 for damages for pain and suffering is clearly reason-
able, and affords no basis for a charge of passion and prejudice on part of
the jury.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Burke concur.
BLIND PENSION-JURISDICTION-MANDAMUS--Colorado Public Wel-
fare Board v. Viles-No. 1459 1-Decided October 2, 1939-Dis-
trict Court of Denver-Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge-Reversed
in part.
FACTS: Plaintiff brought mandamus to compel Board to allow
him pension because of blindness. An alternative writ was issued and
Board demurred on ground that court had no jurisdiction of "person
of respondent or the subject of the action." Demurrer overruled and
Board stands.
HELD: 1. Mandamus is the proper remedy "to compel the per-
formance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office."
2. The District Court, under its general jurisdiction, may review
the acts of any board or commission where it is contended that legal
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rights have been denied, or that such body is vested with a discretion
which it refuses to exercise.
3. The refusal of the board to exercise discretion neither vested
the court with the discretion nor entitled plaintiff to maximum allow-
ance. The mandate of the court should have been to act, and the court
should not have attempted to set the amount of the allowance.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REVIEW OF COMMISSION'S AWARD-
Condon, et al. v. Williams-No. 14624-Decided October 2, 1939
-District Court of Gunnison County-Hon. George W. Bruce,
Judge-Reversed.
HELD: 1. A direct review of Industrial Commission's award may
not be had by an action instituted in the district court; under Section
377, Chapter 97, 1935, C. S. A., unless there is application to the com-
mission for review of its own award, predicate for judicial review is
lacking.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Bakke and
Mr. Justice Burke, concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
PROMISSORY NOTE-APPEAL AND ERROR-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-
CREDITS-Viles, et al. v. Jackson, etc.-No. 14644-Decided
October 2, 1939--County Court of Denver-Hon. E. J. Ingram,
Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Litigants may not properly be precluded from sub-
mitting a draft of bill of exceptions of their own production, but they
proceed so at no little risk.
2. Where litigants do not let court reporter prepare bill of ex-
ceptions, and prepare their own, and the trial court refuses to allow
and sign the bill, they must follow Section 420, Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, strictly; and the affidavit of one that the bill "is true and correct,
in substance, as to my testimony given at the trial," is not sufficient,
without stating that he was present when the exceptions were taken.
3. Where in a suit on a promissory note, a defense is raised to
the effect that in an earlier proceeding-replevin to recover possession
of chattels mortgaged to secure the note-the verified complaint stated
the value of the chattels to be $750.00, the defendants may not insist
upon having credit for such sum on the note in the absence of evidence
as to the value of the goods. "Only on evidence as to the value of
chattels taken in replevin, is there basis for judgment."
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Bakke and
Mr. Justice Burke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
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QUIET TITLE-TAXES-PRIORITY-STARE DECISIS - PLEADING -
TAX TITLES-Fishel v. City and County of Denver-No. 14391
-Decided October 9, 1939-District Court of Denver-Hon.
George F. Dunlee, Judge-Reversed.
HELD: 1. Where motion for judgment on the pleadings is made,
all material allegations of complaint and replication, properly pleaded,
must be accepted as true.
2. A tax deed is not necessarily prematurely issued merely because
less than 3 years and 3 months intervene between date of plaintiff's
certificate and that of his tax deed.
3. The Supreme Court has previously construed Section 3,
Chapter 142, Vol. 4, 1935 C. S. A., page 712, and has held that a lien
created by a sale for general taxes was superior to that of special taxes
for earlier dates.
4. The defense of the City to the quiet title suit based on tax
deed for General taxes, on the ground that it had prior liens for special
improvement taxes is not good.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Bouck not participat-
ing. EN BANC.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-AGENCY-INDEPENDENT CONTRAC-
TOR-CASUAL EMPLOYMENT-Whitney, et at. v. Mountain
States Motors Co.-No. 14629-Decided October 9, 1939-
District Court of Denver-Hon. Floyd F. Miles, Judge-Re-
versed.
HELD: 1. "Whether or not one is an employee (under Section
288 (b), Chapter 97, 1935 C. S. A.) is a question of fact to be de-
termined by the commission. * * * If, however, there is no evi-
dence to support the finding of the commission that claimant was an
employee, it becomes a matter of law, for judicial determination."
2. Evidence considered and found to be sufficient upon which
commission could make reasonable inference that contract hiring claim-
ant was one of employment, contemplating only labor on the job, and
nothing else.
3. The company's contention, that even if claimant is an em-
ployee, nevertheless his employment was but casual and not in the
usual course of the business of the company, is not tenable-the law on
this point has been settled adversely to company's contention.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Bouck concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
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PERSONAL INJURIES-HOTEL KEEPERS-EVIDENCE-CUSTOM-RES
IPSO LOQUITUR-Rudolph, et al. u. Elder-No. 14313-Decided
October 9, 1939-District Court of Denuer-Hon. George F.
Dunklee, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Trial by jury resulted in a recovery of judgment against
defendants in sum of $2,439.28 as damages for personal injuries result-
ing from negligence of defendants. Defendants were lessees and oper-
ators of hotel. Plaintiff sustained injuries when she fell into a freight
elevator shaft adjacent to rear entryway to the hotel.
HELD: 1. It is a hotel keeper's duty to keep his premises reason-
ably safe for the use of his patrons, and that extends to all portions of
the premises to which a guest might reasonably be expected to go.
2. It was a question of fact for the jury to determine whether
the defendants might have reasonably expected plaintiff, as a guest of the
hotel, to use the rear entryway.
3. Evidence that rear passageway had been regularly and freely
used by guests of the hotel for some years in going to and from the
garage, is admissible to show custom and practice from which it well
could be inferred that defendants might reasonably expect other guests
to so use this portion of the hotel.
4. An invitation to a customer or patron to go to certain parts
of business premises may arise by implication from a known customary
use; and a " 'business invitation includes an invitation to use such part
of the premises as the visitor reasonably believes are held open to him as
a means of access to or egress from the place where his business is to be
transacted'."
5. The jury by its verdict for plaintiffs concluded that within
the rear passageway the legal relationship of the defendants and plaintiff
was that of a hotel keeper and guest. "As a result of this relation the de-
fendants would be liable for any bodily injury suffered by her as a
result of defects in the hotel premises known to them or which in the
exercise of reasonable care they could discover."
6. It is apparent that the automatic lock on the door to the shaft
did not operate at the time of the injury. " 'The owner of the ele-
vator must account for the results of all defects which he might have
discovered by due inspection and investigation, but which he failed to
discover and repair'."
7. "Under the doctrine of res ipso loquitur proof of the fact that
an accident resulted from a defect in a mechanical device within the con-
trol of the defendants and which could not have occurred but for such
defect, raises a presumption of negligence sufficient to require the sub-
mission of the case to the jury."
8. " ' * * * Where facts are disputed or inferences there-
from are reasonably disputable,' the question of contributory negligence
is for the jury."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Young concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
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REAL ESTATE-DEEDS-COVENANTS AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES-
Wheeler v. Roby-No. 14376-Decided October 9, 1939-Dis-
trict Court of Pueblo County-Hon. Harry Leddy, Judge-
Affirmed.
HELD: 1. A covenant against encumbrances runs with the land
and inures to subsequent purchasers.
2. Where purchaser of property by deed covenanting against en-
cumbrances including taxes, has to pay taxes, he may sue grantor of
deed, and recover; and this is so although grantee conveyed property to a
third party and then re-took title, since he had it at the time of suit and
at the time the taxes in question were paid.
3. Defendant in counter-claim contended for $1,650.00. He
claimed the property that he got from plaintiff in the exchange was
supposed to have been fenced and that only about 5,000 of 18,000
acres was actually fenced. The claim was properly dismissed for it was
so indefinite and uncertain that without resort to speculation it would
have been impossible for the court to have determined the amount
claimed, or any other amount that would have had any reasonable
basis of support in the testimony.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Knous and Mr.
Justice Bakke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
CRIMINAL LAW-CAUSING DEATH OF PERSON WHILE DRIVING
MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING
LIQUOR-INSTRUCTIONS-Rinehart v. People-No. 14478-De-
cided October 9, 1939-District Court of Adams County-Hon.
H. E. Munson, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Supreme Court will not interfere with verdict of jury
where there is ample evidence to sustain it. The jury is the judge of
the credibility of the witnesses and is to determine the weight of the testi-
mony.
2. Instructions given considered together and found to contain
the law.
3. In a criminal action for causing death while driving a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, it is proper to
give the following instruction:
"The court instructs the jury that when a driver is so under the
influence of intoxicating liquor that his capacity to operate an automo-
bile is impaired, he is intoxicated within the meaning of the law."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Bock dissent. EN BANC.
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INJUNCTION-INTERFERENCE WITH USE OF PREMISES USED FOR
OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION-Mountain States Oil Corporation v.
Sandoval-No. 14636-Decided October 9, 1939-District Court
of Las Animas County-Hon. David M. Ralston, Judge-
Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Under evidence in case, it appears that no injunctive
remedy is desirable, and that only an accounting is advisable. Evidence
examined in light of referee's findings and court's decree and no reversi-
ble error found.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Young and
Mr. Justice Knous concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER COLORADO'S UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA-
TION ACT-INSURANCE AGENTS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-
Equitable Life Insurance Company v. Industrial Commission-
No. 14515-Decided October 16, 1939-District Court of Denver
-Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The controversy raises the question of whether or not
a life insurance company is required to make contributions under the
Colorado compensation act (S. L. '36, 3rd Ex. Sess., c. 2, '35 C. S. A.,
'37 Supp., c. 167A), as amended, with respect to compensation payable
to general, district, special and soliciting agents. Trial Court entered
judgment in favor of the commission for contribution by the insurance
company under the act. The insurance company seeks to reverse such
judgment.
HELD: 1. This case is controlled by the case of Industrial Com-
mission v. North Western Mutual Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo. 550,
88 p. (2d) 560.
2. The insurance company raises the question of the validity of
the application of the act to its agents under the due-process and equal-
protection clauses of the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Such Constitutional questions are not controlling in this case, since they
are based solely upon the premise that the agents of the insurance com-
pany are independent contractors and bear no relation to the insurance
company as servants. Under the act as construed in the Northwestern
Mutual Life Insurance case, supra, the activities of the company's agents
are within the legislative definition of "employment".
3. In view of the fact that the contracts of employment between
company and agent called for the exclusive service of the agent or for
a fixed portion of his time and efforts, for continuous employment, and
not for a specific piece of work, and in view of the fact that the com-
pany determines who may assist, and who shall supervise, the activities
of the agent, and the company controls the agent's offices, and the con-
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tracts are not assignable by the agents, and call for their personal per-
formance of service, it is unnecessary to determine the constitutional
questions raised.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Burke specially con-
curring. EN BANC.
SALARY FOR STATE DIRECTOR OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING-STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION-Bedford, etc. v. People, ex rel. Tiemann-
No. 14451 -Decided October 16, 1939-District Court of Denver
-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: A. T was employed by the State Board for vocational
education as State Director. The Board fixed his salary at $4,500.00
per annum, and directed that $3,600.00 be paid out of a particular
legislative appropriation; and issued its vouchers accordingly. The
auditor refused to issue warrants for the vouchers. T brought man-
damus and the auditor demurred. The lower court overruled the de-
murrer.
B. The federal government contributed funds for the work of
the board and the latter had full discretion in their expenditure. Sec. 4,
Chapter 264, S. L. 1937, empowers board to fix salary of T. Chap-
ter 53, S. L. 1937 makes an appropriation for $3,600.00 annually for
the Director. "(Less any amount received from the federal government
or agencies, it being the intention that the total salary of said director
shall not exceed $4,000.00 per year.)" Both chapters were approved
on the same Uay and $900.00 per annum, prorata, of T's salary was
accordingly to be paid out of said federal funds. The auditor contends
that because of the above parenthetical clause, T could only draw
$3,100 out of the State appropriations.
HELD: 1. Where statutes must be considered in panl materia,
apparent inconsistencies must, if possible, be reconciled.
2. The Board had full power to fix T's salary.
3. The parenthetical provision is clear "as the noon-day sun",
and is not void on the ground of ambiguity and unintelligibility.
4. The act is not unconstitutional on the ground that it is an
appropriation bill which fixes a salary since the clause is merely a simple
condition attached to an appropriation which may reduce but cannot
increase the sum.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Young and Mr.
Justice Knous dissent. Mr. Justice Bock not participating. EN BANC.
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS - PROCESS - JURISDICTION - SERVICE ON
AGENT-AGENCY-General Benefit Ass'n v. Bell-No. 14447-
Decided October 16, 1939-District Court of Denver-Hon.
Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Reversed.
HELD: 1. Where suit is brought in Colorado on a judgment
obtained in Missouri, the question of proper service of process in original
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suit (and jurisdiction over the defendant in personam) may be raised.
2. Where it appears that a Missouri beneficiary of a Colorado
non-profit benefit association caused process to be served in Missouri
upon a former solicitor for the association, but who had not sold any
certificates for the company for three years, and had been dropped by
the association as a solicitor over a year before service of process, and
where it appears that said purported agent told the sheriff that he was
not an agent of the company and hadn't been for some time prior to
sheriff's leaving of the summons with him, such service is not valid.
3. The agent upon whom process is served must occupy that
relation to the corporation at the time of service.
4. The service of process is jurisdictional and the return made
by the sheriff is not conclusive.
5. Service of process upon an agent for a foreign corporation
doing business within the state must be upon an agent representing
the corporation with respect to such business. It may not be upon
a mere servant or employee whose authority and duties are limited to
a particular transaction. There was no "fair and reasonable inference
of a duty" on the agent to communicate the fact of service upon him to
the company.
6. It is not necessary that the agent have express authority to re-
ceive process, but his relationship with the company must be of such
representative capacity that it would be fair to say that the delivery of
the summons to him constituted a valid service of process.
7. An agency, once existing, is presumed to have continued, in
absence of any thing to show its termination, unless such a length of
time has elapsed as destroys the presumption.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. EN BANC.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-INSTRUCTIONS-PENALTY-Leopold V.
People-No. 14603-Decided October 16, 1939-District Court
of Denver-Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Instructions considered, and the use of the word
"homicide" rather than "murder" found to be proper.
2. A homicide is the killing of a human being by another, and
may be justifiable, and therefore, not unlawful.
3. A tendered instruction (refused) was improper since the trial
court has no duty to, and should not, select the salient points in the
evidence, and specifically call them to the attention of the jurors.
4. Proof of specific intent is not a prerequisite to a conviction for
first degree murder where a homicide is committed in the perpetration of
a robbery.
5. An instruction which permits the jury unlimited considera-
tion of defendant's intent in connection with fixing the penalty for the
crime, is patently favorable to the accused and he may not complain.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. EN BANC.
V. J. POBRISLO
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